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JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND THE ELECTION OF
JUDGES
NATHAN

S. HEFFERNAN*

It is a pleasure and an honor be the first E. Harold Hallows Judicial
Fellow. I had the privilege of serving on the Wisconsin Supreme Court
with Justice Hallows from August 1964, when I came to the court, until
July 1974, when he retired. For about seven years he was my chief-a
judge whom I very much admired and respected. Harold Hallows was
a great judge and an exceptional scholar. He was on the Marquette Law
School faculty for many years. He was an expert in the field of equity
jurisprudence, and for twenty-eight years he practiced law in the City of
Milwaukee. His record of being a skilled practitioner as well as a
distinguished academician has seldom been matched in the history of the
Wisconsin courts.
Harold Hallows was, in a very real sense, the founder of our present
court system-whose essential elements are a one-level trial court, the
result of the abolition of county courts and their re-creation as circuit
courts; the establishment of the court of appeals; and a constitutionally
reinvigorated Supreme Court whose chief justice is the administrator of
the entire court system.
It was Harold Hallows who went to Governor Lucey in 1971 and
persuaded him that the court system was in serious trouble and that the
Supreme Court was being deluged by an increasing caseload which in
effect denied justice to the people of Wisconsin. Chief Justice Hallows
persuaded Governor Lucey to appoint a "blue ribbon committee" to
study the problems of the court system and to recommend solutions to
those problems.
Governor Lucey commissioned The Citizens Study Committee on
Judicial Organization to provide rational solutions to the problems of the
judicial system. The proposed solutions were to be a part of a long-range plan instead of patchwork tinkering and minor modifications that

* Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court (1983-1995); Justice, Wisconsin Supreme
Court (1964-1983). B.A. 1942, University of Wisconsin-Madison; L.L.B. 1948, University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
This article was adapted from the inaugural E. Harold Hallows Judicial Fellow lecture
given at Marquette University Law School on March 27, 1996.
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marked the so-called judicial reforms of the past.
The impetus for court reform came from the judge and scholar we
honor today, Justice Harold Hallows. The people of Wisconsin and the
state's judiciary are forever in his debt. I hasten to add that Harold
would have left his mark as a great justice and chief justice regardless of
the fact that he was the key contributor to our court reorganization of
the 1970's.
Let me repeat a portion of a talk that I gave on January 19, 1969, at
a dinner in honor of Chief Justice Hallows. I commented then:
Chief Justice Hallows has been a great asset to the judiciary as a
whole. He is concerned about the art of judging and has sought
ways to make himself and other judges more effective in bringing
inexpensive, faster, but higher quality justice to the entire state.
He has been a leader in judicial reform. As a lawyer and judge,
he has been an advocate of court reorganization. He is an
enthusiastic backer of the college of trial judges and the Appellate Judges Seminar. He is a staunch advocate of better working
conditions and adequate compensation for all judges. He has
supported special training for new judges so litigants will not be
the victims of a judge's inexperience.
As Chief Justice of Wisconsin, he has-even as he did before
his judgeship-stressed the independence of the judiciary and its
right and obligation to make decisions free from partisan
pressures or the passions of the moment.
He has administratively improved the court so that, despite an
increased workload, it operates more efficiently than ever before.
Under the leadership of Harold Hallows the Supreme Court is a
smoothly working team-a team not in the sense that we all have
the same idea on each case, but rather that we have the same
ideal, the furtherance of justice in our legal system.
Our attempts to reach this ideal.., are coordinated by the
chief justice so that we expeditiously arrive at our conclusions
after a fair and rational exchange of ideas.
He is learned in the law and in the problems of our society.
His great experience makes him ... an indispensable asset to our
state and our legal system. I am honored to be his colleague, and
I am proud to have him as my chief.
I should note, however, that Justice Hallows could be difficult. He
possessed the arrogance that comes from a superior intellect and from
insights that he sometimes correctly believed were not always given to
others.
Chief Justice Hallows always insisted that obiter dictum be expunged
from all of our opinions. He felt that "dicta" was an abuse of the
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powers of a common law court, and weakened the value of an opinion
as a precedent. On one occasion, Justice Horace Wilkie, on examining
one of Justice Hallow's opinions recently circulated to the court
discovered what he thought was dicta and decided he should talk to the
Chief about it. Justice Wilkie said, "Harold, see this paragraph, it looks
like dicta to me." Justice Hallows paused, read the paragraph out loud
and said, "It's dicta, but it's good dicta. It stays in."
Because I so respect and honor the great judge whose memory has
triggered this occasion, I have some unease about my general position
concerning the selection of judges. My position is opposed to one of the
propositions that Hallows, among others, convinced the Citizens
Committee to adopt in its report-that the elective system of selecting
judges be abolished in Wisconsin and that judges should be selected by
appointment on the basis of "merit." The Citizens Committee proposed
that the governor nominate judicial candidates, but that a Commission
on Judicial Qualifications should conduct a thorough investigation of the
nominee or nominees proposed by the governor and advise the governor
of the qualifications of each. If a nominee was not certified as qualified
by the Commission, the governor could not appoint that person.
It is my view that the elective system in Wisconsin has worked
reasonably well and should not be discarded. Rather, contrary to the
mandate of Governor Lucey, the elective system should be "tinkered
with" by instituting a reasonable system of public financing of judicial
elections which would hopefully cure the principal ills attendant to the
election of judges.
Before discussing the pros and cons of an elective system, let us
examine the events that preceded the work of the Citizens Court Study
Committee. In 1967, Chief Justice George R. Currie was defeated.
Chief Justice Currie was widely regarded as one of the great common
law judges of the United States. When I was first elected, nationally
recognized jurists as Roger Traynor of California, Walter Shaeffer of
Illinois, and Frank Kennison of New Hampshire came to me at judicial
meetings and commented on how fortunate I was to be a colleague of
George Currie.
Chief Justice Currie, however great his qualities of intellect and
character, was far from being a charismatic personality. Although
intellectually vigorous, he gave the impression on. the platform of
ambivalence and unease. He was soundly defeated by an eloquent
circuit judge, who proved to be extremely capable, but never gave the
electorate any reason for replacing a truly distinguished jurist.
I believe it was Chief Justice George Currie's defeat that cast a pall
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over the wisdom of continuing the elective system for the judiciary and
was a principal factor in the Committee's decision.
However, the question of whether judges should be elected or
appointed has persisted over the years, dating back even to prerevolutionary days in America. Accordingly, I do not hope to convince
you that one method is in all circumstances clearly superior. With our
recent judicial elections raising a high degree of anxiety among those
who are court watchers, I will address some of the points argued by
proponents and opponents of the present system. While legal scholars
and political scientists have covered this area with great thoughtfulness
by legal scholars and political scientists, I will attempt to convey my
personal impressions and insights as one who was first appointed to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court by Governor Reynolds in 1964 and subsequently elected to three ten-year terms. Regarding my three elections,
the first one was a hotly contested election, including the primary; in my
second election I faced only nominal opposition, and my third one was
the best type of election for an incumbent-an election with no
opposition. In my nearly thirty-one years as a judge, I have enjoyed the
initial appointive process and have undergone the anxieties and the
euphoria attendant upon the elective system.
During my second campaign, I had what appeared to be only token
opposition, but my opponent had run for the court on several earlier
occasions so I took him seriously. Early in the campaign, he and I
appeared at a League of Women Voters forum. After some rather
uninformative and desultory interchanges, the interviewer asked, "Mr. A,
I was wondering why you're running for this office. The general opinion
is that your chances are very slim." The reply was, "Well, I don't expect
to win, but Justice Heffernan is campaigning all over the state on these
slippery roads and if he is killed in an accident, I automatically will be
elected." About a week later Mrs. Heffernan and I headed out of
Madison to Wausau on a slippery, snowy morning. When a car ahead
of us skidded and spun out of control into a ditch, Mrs. Heffernan, who
was driving, slowed and said, "We're going home. We're not going to
go to Wausau today." In fact, after that, I never left Madison during
that campaign.
I should state that the present system has been good to me. Perhaps,
therefore, I am not as impartial an observer as I ought to be.
Let me address the history of the selection of judges in America and
Wisconsin. In the litany of grievances set forth in the Declaration of
Independence appears this, "[The king] has made judges dependent on
his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
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payment of their salaries."' There was the corollary complaint that the
king had refused his assent to "laws for establishing judiciary power."
It is important to note that the colonists objected to the appointive
powers of the executive, yet almost all of the currently proposed "merit"
systems of judicial selection would vest appointive powers in the
executive-the governor-and generally without the consent of the
legislature.
The Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1787, translated the
concerns of the colonists into fundamental law by the provision that
stated the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the Supreme Court...
*,2 Hence in Article II of the Constitution, the power for the final
selection of judges was shared by the executive and the representatives
of the people in the Senate.
In addition to wresting this sole power from the executive, the
Constitution addressed the other grievance of the Declaration of
Independence. Judges were dependent upon the will of the executive for
tenure and for the amount and payment of salaries.3 The Constitution,
however, provided that all judges of the United States, whether of the
Supreme Court or of other Article III courts, were to hold their offices
"during good behavior" and be paid a salary that could not be diminished "during their continuance in office." 4
These provisions of the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution set the pattern for years to come. Clearly the founding
fathers wanted independence and stability in the judiciary, free of
exclusive executive control and free of the whims of pure democratic
control that might come from an elected judiciary.
John Marshall, touting the virtues of the selection system under a
Constitution that granted judicial independence, stated at the Virginia
Convention, "[T]he greatest scourge that could be inflicted upon an
ungrateful and sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt or dependent
judiciary." It would appear he feared the people almost as much as he
feared a dependent judiciary.
Initially all of the new states selected their judges by executive
appointment shared with the legislature. Gradually, however, with the
expansion of the frontier, some states adopted the elective system. Of

1.
2.
3.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. at art. III, § 1.

4. Id.
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the original thirteen states, Georgia was the first to shift to an elective
system for the selection of lower court judges in 1812. Indiana, admitted
to the Union in 1816, provided in its constitution for the election of some
of its judges, and in 1832, Mississippi decided to elect all of its judges.
The theory of popular election of all officers, which came to be
known as "Jacksonian Democracy," held sway from the late 1840's until
the middle of this century. In fact, by the time of the Civil War, twentyfour of thirty-four states had adopted an elected judiciary. It was not
until 1959, with the admission of Alaska, that any new state stood against
the tide of a fully elected judiciary.'
Wisconsin, admitted in 1848, became a state at the high tide of
Jacksonian democracy. The Story of a Great Court reveals that one

principal philosophical justification for the election of judges was simply
that under our American theory of government, the source of all power
was the people.6 Hence, inasmuch as both executive and legislative
officers were elected by the people, consistency demanded that the
judicial branch, of a constitutionally co-equal and independent dimension, also be elected in order to have a claim to legitimacy.
This argument flies in the face of much thoughtful and scholarly
teaching, but it did prevail when the Wisconsin Constitution was finally
adopted. The vote at the Wisconsin Constitutional convention was
seventy-eight to twenty in favor of the elective system despite opposition
from such leaders as Edward G. Ryan, "Lion of the Law" and Chief
Justice from 1874-80.
Many others learned in the law have opposed the elective system.
Chief Justice Hallows was one of them. In addition, Harold Laski, a
prominent political thinker early in this century, stated, "for the election
of judges by popular vote there is nothing to be said." Nevertheless, the
elective system in Wisconsin has never been seriously challenged,
although there has been an occasional and sometimes a deep dissatisfaction with it.
During this century three Wisconsin Supreme Court justices with
outstanding records were defeated at the polls. I have mentioned
George Currie, who was defeated in 1967 by Robert Hansen. In
addition, after serving an initial appointment lasting less than two years,
James Ward Rector was defeated in 1946 by Henry Hughes, and Emmert

5.

See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED

STATES (1993).
6. JOHN B. WINSLOW, THE STORY OF A GREAT COURT (1912). Winslow was the chief
justice of Wisconsin from 1907 to 1920.
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L. Wingert, after serving only a twenty-eight month appointment, was
defeated in 1958 by William Dietrich. Each of these defeated justices
was recognized as an outstanding lawyer and scholar-a fine writer of
judicial opinions and a person of impeccable integrity. They, however,
shared an added characteristic with Chief Justice George Currie. They
were rather shy and retiring and lacked the presumptuous ego that a
candidate for public office seems to need. In short, they were not
politicians. They, like Currie, were "charismatically impaired."
Like many lawyers at the time, I deplored the defeat of Emmert
Wingert by Bill Dietrich. However, it was a serendipitous event for me
because in 1964, when Justice Dietrich suffered a fatal heart attack, I was
appointed to succeed him.
The defeats of these three outstanding jurists triggered talk of
changing the system, but no substantial change was initiated. After Fred
R. Zimmerman, former governor and non-lawyer, nearly defeated
incumbent Justice Elmer Barlow in 1945 and in 1949 again ran well
against a field of seven lawyers, a constitutional amendment was adopted
requiring that all judges be licensed as lawyers for at least five years
prior to election or appointment.7
The principal saving grace of the Wisconsin elective system has been
its nonpartisan nature. Former Chief Justice John B. Winslow pointed
out that nothing in the constitutional debates indicated the existence of
a belief or even a desire that judges should not be nominated and
supported by political parties.' There was, however, an opinion that
judges would be less partisan if they were nominated by political parties
rather than selected by the executive. This is an argument I do not
understand. However, as Winslow noted, even in the early days of our
courts there evolved "a sentiment which has slowly crystallized among
the people of the state to the effect that judges ...

should not be

nominated by political parties and that a sitting judge who has performed
his duties faithfully should be retained ...regardless of his political
opinions." 9
Although the Wisconsin constitutional debates envisioned political
slating, the state constitution itself provided that "[t]here shall be no
election for a justice or judge at the partisan general election for state or
county officers, nor within 30 days either before or after such elec-

7. WIS. CoNsT., Art. VII, § 24.
8. WINSLOW, supra note 6, at 1-10.
9. Id. at 7
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tion. ,10
This provision has remained substantially intact. It is an unusual
provision in state constitutions and in researching materials collected by
the American Judicature Society, I was unable to find an analogous
constitutional provision in any state. Even in Missouri, where a number
of counties have adopted a selection process based on a nonpartisan
nominating commission, the retention election, though it was a separate
judicial ballot, apparently takes place at the same time as the general
partisan election.
This clause in the Wisconsin Constitution, prohibiting judicial
elections to be held at or in near proximity to other state and local
partisan elections, has had a great effect. It changed the vision of judges
being office holders beholden to a party or a partisan cause to one where
the judiciary is truly nonpartisan. Of course Wisconsin's provision has
also had the effect of markedly reducing the number of voters at a
judicial election. The question to be asked is, we really trust the people
to pick judges, shouldn't we have them vote at a time that is more likely
to assure maximum participation? The argument is that because the
vote is lower in judicial elections, it produces a better informed and more
interested electorate. I am not convinced that is the case. Also, the
constitutional provision" that vacancies during the term are to be filled
by gubernatorial appointment to serve until a subsequent election has
changed the Wisconsin judiciary from one wholly dependent upon the
election process to one substantially influenced by appointment.
Winslow stated that as of 1912, eleven of the Supreme Court's twentyfive justices were placed on the court by gubernatorial appointment and
all but one of those appointments was later ratified by election. 12 When
Henry Hughes was elected to the bench in 1947, he was the first justice
in thirty years to initially reach the Supreme Court bench by election.
In examining the history of the Wisconsin Supreme Court from its
separate existence in 1853, forty-one of its sixty-eight justices came to the
court by appointment. This represents a little over sixty percent. During
my tenure of thirty-one years, eleven of nineteen justices were originally
appointed by the governor; that number is about fifty-eight percent.
Hence, it is apparent that a clear majority of our supreme court justices
have been selected by the governor. Do we really have an "elected"
judiciary?
10. WIS. CONST. art. VII,

§ 9.

11. Id.
12. WINSLOW, supra note 6, at 8-9.

1997]

JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY

1039

In the first decades after the adoption of the constitution, there were
partisan conflicts in judicial elections. The issues of slavery, the role of
the federal government, federal supremacy as it affected the interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Act, and the dispute with President Lincoln
over federal habeas corpus, frequently created partisan strife in the
courts. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its own "judicial" civil war,
rejected federal supremacy and refused to honor or even to follow the
mandate of the United States Supreme Court's opinion reversing the
Wisconsin Court's decision in Ableman v. Booth.13 Our elected court,
in effect, nullified the Fugitive Slave Act which was supported by the
appointed United States Supreme Court. A discussion of these issues,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
The last hurrah during the hey-day of partisan nomination by party
caucus came in 1879, when the Democratic Central Committee met and
nominated Montgomery M. Cothren of Mineral Point, Wisconsin.
Cothren adhered to the statement that only "important men and sound
Democrats who had never swerved from the straight line of party duty
or allegiance to Democratic principles should be nominated or elected."
Justice Orasmus Cole, despite his Republican party antecedents, was
elected as an independent in 1853 and was re-elected as a nonpartisan
in 1860. In 1879 he again ran as a nonpartisan and was elected over
Cothren, handily defeating him by a margin of 33,000 votes in a 168,000
vote election. This was the last judicial election in which any candidate
chose to run as a partisan.
The 1879 election was substantially without issues. One of the
disadvantages of nonpartisan campaigning without party issues is the
substitution of specious issues during the campaign. This problem
remains with us to this day. The issue raised in opposition to Cole was
his age. The Milwaukee News, supporting Cothren, said of Cole: "[Hie
has arrived at an age where a man's perceptions grow dim."14 In
another edition of the same paper, this statement appeared: "He is an
old man, the duties are becoming irksome to him. He has arrived at an
age when United States judges are retired and pensioned off." 5 In fact,
Justice Cole was fifty-nine years old and in excellent health and was but
twenty-six days older than the candidate who sought to replace him. 6
As history demonstrates, Cole served on the court in good health until

13.
14.
15.
16.

62 U.S. 506 (1858)
WINSLOW, supra note 6, at 372 (quoting MILWAUKEE NEWS, Feb. 23, 1879).
Id. (quoting MILWAUKEE NEWS, Mar. 4, 1879).
Id.
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1892. Even then, he was urged to run again and if he had done so, it
was conceded that he would have been re-elected without opposition.
So much for "real" issues in the "good old days."
The election of Cole in 1879 was the last time partisan nomination or
selection by a legislative or a party caucus was attempted. As Justice
Winslow stated, the party caucus followed the party convention to the
political graveyard. "Henceforth, nominations for justices of the
Supreme Court were made by nonpartisan calls."17
By 1910, Justice Winslow commented that any partisan political
activity by a Wisconsin candidate was considered
a breach of judicial etiquette ....[a]n attempt to place a party

candidate in the field would almost certainly with defeat. That
this condition of public opinion makes for independence and
efficiency of the judiciary there can be no doubt. In this respect,
as in many others, Wisconsin is in the best sense a progressive
commonwealth.' 8
I have my own experience with respect to the nonpartisan nature of
a judicial election. I had been an active Democrat. I had served as
general chairman of two state Democratic conventions and was serving
as United States Attorney by the appointment of John F.Kennedy when
I was appointed to the court by Governor Reynolds, also a Democrat.
The co-chairs of my election campaign, however, were Stewart Honeck,
the former Republican Attorney General, and James E. Doyle, Sr., who
was probably Wisconsin's leading Democrat. The chair of my Citizens
Committee was former Republican Governor Oscar Rennebohm, and
one of my leading supporters was the chair of the Dane County
Republican Party. I do not think that this kind of bi-partisan support
has been unusual. In fact, it is typical and almost traditional.
Justice Winslow did not carry his story of a great court beyond the
commencement of his tenure in1898. However, the provisions for the
appointment, election, and retention of judges have remained substantially unchanged, with the exception that some governors by the 1950s paid
lip service to the merit selection of judges. Walter Kohler, Jr. and John
W. Reynolds both used an ad hoc, perhaps post hoc, merit screening
system for the Wisconsin Supreme Court. They first made a personal
selection based on subjective criteria and then asked the Bar Committee
on Judicial Selection to ratify their choice by publicly proclaiming that
the person selected by the governor had the necessary requisites of
17. Id. at 375.
18. Id. at 386.
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learning and integrity to hold the office. This was a political plus for an
appointee, who was required to run for office at the first opportunity.
This system also guaranteed that the governor exercised his constitutional responsibility to select judges for vacancies and, at the same time,
allowed the governor to satisfy his own political agenda-that his
selectee would, hopefully, conform to the political preferences of the
governor and his party. Because the governor only submitted his single
preference to the committee, it was fait accompli. The committee was
not likely to demur.
There were instances, however, when governors made appointments
on non-political grounds. For example, Republican Walter Koher, Sr.,
appointed Democrat John D. Wickhem on the basis of his qualifications
as a legal scholar and a law professor of national repute. Additionally,
Harold Hallows, who had never been a figure in partisan politics, was
appointed by Governor Vernon Thompson, a very partisan Republican.
Even when a governor made an appointment that he hoped would
prove politically satisfactory to him and his party, he did so knowing that
once the judge took office, there were no political ties to bind him. The
new judge was beyond the governor's control. When I was appointed by
Governor Reynolds in 1964, he said, "Well today I probably have made
10 enemies and one ingrate." Regarding the ingrate, he added, "and
that's the way it should be." I know of no governor who has even
implied that an appointee would be "his" judge when it came to passing
on the merits of gubernatorial action, although the governor may have
hoped that he had not appointed an ingrate. The press mistakenly
assumes that judges will support the political agenda of the appointing
authority. Consider, however, the Watergate tapes: how wrong was the
press' speculation!
It should also be emphasized that governors make judicial appointments in good faith. They know that judges will probably hold office
long after the governors have departed. Governors also know the
quality of their term of office will be evaluated, in part, by their judicial
appointments. When I became a judge, the LaFollette progressive
movement was long dead, but a large number of judges on the bench
remained who were originally LaFollette appointees.
In Wisconsin, the populist sentiment that judges should be elected to
express the "will" of the people remains strong. As previously stated, in
1973, Governor's Committee on Court Reform recommended the
abandonment of the elective system. However, important committee
members, particularly those from organized labor, felt so strongly about
continuing the elective system that there was a threat the whole reform
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package would be defeated. Consequently, before the constitutional
amendments were proposed, the merit system of selection by the
governor was withdrawn. I think, however, that we should recognize the
political reality of the moment. Furthermore, no matter what the
theorists and political philosophers might think, there has been, in
general, no popular dissatisfaction with the elective system.
In 1996, however, I believe there is a sense that something is awry in
how we select our judges in Wisconsin. Charges are made that campaign
contributions taint the process, that partisan political operatives are
assisting in the campaign and that there is an implicit promise (or at least
the appearance of a promise) that the beneficiary of such political
assistance will support, in court, the political agenda of those supporters.
In addition, the cost of judicial elections has become far greater than
could have been predicted only a few decades ago. When I first ran for
the Supreme Court in 1965 following my appointment, my committee
spent somewhere between $40,000 and $50,000-and it was a reasonably
well-financed campaign. When Justice Hallows appeared before the
Court Reorganization Committee in 1972, he testified that campaign
costs then were approximately $50,000, and that this great cost militated
against continued election of judges.
Television, the great consumer of campaign dollars, was only in its
infancy when I ran in 1965. There was so little network programming
that local stations were hungry for whatever they could put on the air.
I went to the University of Wisconsin Photo Lab and had them prepare
two short video tapes carrying my campaign message. The cost of the
tapes was less than $100, and the TV stations aired them at no cost to
me, just to fill up air time. A great bargain indeed, but perhaps few
were watching or listening even then.
Justice William Bablitch, who has closely monitored the cost of
judicial campaigns, estimates that even a rather minimal state supreme
court race will cost from $350,000 to $400,000. A candidate for the
Supreme Court must campaign statewide and pitch the campaign to the
same potential electorate that votes for the governor. The territory to
be covered is huge-from Superior to Kenosha to the extreme southwest
of the state-so the costs are huge.
Even if campaign funds are not solicited from major political action
committees with expressed political agendas, contributions from
individuals carry with them overtones of a quid pro quo. The most likely
individual contributors are lawyers. Some may argue that lawyers are
officers of the court and as such are only interested in stimulating the
educational aspect of the election process or are only hoping for a
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"good" judge as a contribution to the general welfare. It has been my
experience that lawyers make contributions in the "hope" that the
recipient will vote "right," although I can truly say that no lawyer in over
thirty years has ever indicated to me that his or her contribution was for
an expected favor. In fact, numerous lawyers have made contributions
in subsequent elections even after I had voted "wrong" on issues
important to them.
While some candidates assert they do not even know who contributes
to their campaign, I find this hard to believe because contributions are
a public record and the candidate is usually present at fundraising events.
But even if those judges are adamant that they will not be influenced by
contributions, can they really be sure? Perhaps they are subconsciously
influenced or they may bend over backward to be fair, which may indeed
deny justice to contributors.
It is clear in the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court campaign that
there were no genuine issues as compared to the way voters perceive
issues in a political campaign. When deciding whom to vote for people
are taught to examine issues, not personalities. But in the 1996 election
for the Supreme Court, newspapers complained that one of the
candidates for the Supreme Court was "flamboyant" and the other
"boring." The adjectives are for the media to choose. They could just
as well have typified the candidates as "flaky" and "thoughtful" or
"inspirational" and "dull." These adjectives are not helpful touchstones
for the selection of a judge whose job it is to find and construe the law,
not on the basis of idiosyncratic surface characteristics, but on the basis
of scholarship, integrity, and jurisprudential principles of the common
law.
There are admittedly grave problems inherent in the election of
judges. While judges no longer need bend to the whim of a king, do
they bend to the whim of the electorate? Do candidates curry favor with
the electorate by what appears to be the current popular sentiment? If
the cry is for law and order, are candidates likely to vie with each other
to be the toughest sentencer? We should remind ourselves, as Chief
Justice Hallows reminded us, that there may be "hard" judges and "soft"
judges, but what we need are "just" judges. It is sometimes difficult for
a judge facing election to ignore the momentary popular will, and it is
difficult to campaign on "justice" alone. A "just" judge is very likely to
be politically vulnerable for being legally right.
Aside from these appeals to the passing passions of the populace, it
is difficult to frame meaningful campaign issues. If a candidate cannot
pose as either a Republican or a Democrat and espouse the respective
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partisan position, what can the candidate stand for in an election?
Emmert Wingert based his campaign on the proposal to repeal the
"deadman's statute." The issue did not attract popular fancy. He lost.
Another candidate campaigned on the problems inherent in the parole
evidence rule. The subject failed to electrify the public. Accordingly,
candidates may be reduced to "flamboyancy," for there is little else for
the public to see and understand.
There have been Supreme Court elections, however, when crucial
policy decisions of constitutional proportion were decided and where
there were real issues. When the first support for court reform surfaced,
it was clear that the legislature would not propose or pass the necessary
amendments. Despite the legislatures inaction, each incumbent on the
court campaigned on the real issues of court reform: the Court of
Appeals; one-level trial court; discipline and removal of judges; and
vesting the Supreme Court and its chief with control over the court
system. Each incumbent was fortunate enough to have an opponent who
opposed the reform platform. In each instance the incumbent won. The
issue of court reform and detailed information on the issue was conveyed
to the people. The legislature took notice that court reform was popular
with the people. The legislature put the constitutional amendments on
the ballot and they won overwhelmingly. The election process worked
and assured the needed court reform.
Additionally, to go before the public and merely say "what a bright
person am I" can be an ego-smashing venture. When there are no
issues, defeat can only be viewed as a personal rejection. It cannot be
explained away as merely a rejection of controversial policies. The
process of election may discourage excellent judicial candidates whose
only purpose is to follow the law and judge wisely. When an election is
carried on in a sterile, academic, personality-centered way, we are likely
to elect outwardly attractive persons who have not revealed a bit about
their personal principles or even whether they have any at all.
Judicial elections may depend on questions and circumstances that
are entirely extraneous to the merits of the candidates. When I ran in
a contested election, I benefitted from the fact that there were hotly
contested elections for mayor in Milwaukee, Madison, and Sheboyganall Wisconsin localities where I had substantial support. It was these
other races, not mine, that produced my vote. If there had not been the
concern for the mayoral races, there probably would have been a very
low turnout and I probably would have lost the election.
Judicial races in many instances are skewed by other races. While
the Wisconsin Constitution provides that there shall be no judicial
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election within thirty days of a partisan election for state and county
officers, 9 there is no prohibition of judicial election that coincides with
a presidential primary. While a presidential primary is likely to produce
a huge partisan turnout of persons whose least concern is the judicial
election, they will vote. Even in run-of-the-mill elections, the judicial
choices are likely to be an afterthought or of no thought at all. One
survey of voters who did vote for judge at a general election in New
York revealed that immediately following the election, seventy-five
percent of the voters could not remember the name of the person for
whom they voted.
The elective system has another disadvantage. During the campaign,
for a period of four to six months, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is
deprived of the full attention of one of its members. This is a grievous
wound to the court and deprives the citizens of a fully attentive court.
In one instance that I recall, one justice of the Supreme Court at the end
of the campaign had twenty-three opinions assigned but none completed.
The opinions were finally completed, but I doubt the task was accomplished with the carefulness and thoroughness of a judge who did not
have campaigning on the mind. Consider also the recent bizarre
situation that occurred when all the judges of the court of appeals in
Milwaukee were simultaneously campaigning for a judicial office.
Thus, it is rather apparent that there are grave defects in our present
system of judicial selection. In a sense, however, it calls to mind
Winston Churchill's remark that democracy is the worst possible system
of government except for all others. One of the charges leveled against
our system is that when compared to a "merit" system, it does not
recruit the best lawyers to be judges, particularly when there is no
assurance of tenure. In response, I reiterate the names of lawyers who
came to the bench directly from the law practice and with whom I
served: Currie, Fairchild, Hallows, Day, Abrahamson, and Wilkie all
were leaders of the bar, secure in their reputations and livelihood. Yet,
they eagerly accepted appointment to the court. I would match those
judges collectively against any who would be chosen by merit and with
a system of tenure. It is argued that we will not get the best lawyers to
play this "high risk" game; yet the fact is that we have attracted the best.
It is also argued that the elective system has a chilling effect upon a
judge's opinions. Perhaps that is true, but this adage gives too little
respect to the courage of elected judges. All judges know that there is

19. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
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some risk in the decisions they make, sometimes even a career-killing
risk. Yet, I would not attribute less courage to judges than to other
elected officials who put their careers on the line. Also, we should
remember that the terms are long, for the Supreme Court a term is ten
years a period established for the specific purpose of lessening the impact
of a particular decision on a judge's chances for election. Yet, as Mr.
Dooley stated in the early 1900's, "Even the supreme court reads the
newspapers." Judges should not be too confined to the ivory tower. I
do not suggest that they be intimidated by that "jungle" out there, but
they should be aware of the effect of their decisions in real life. Judges
should ask whether their decisions will work; judging should not be
simply an abstract exercise in sterile logic.
I also submit that the election process affords the Wisconsin judiciary
some legitimacy as a co-equal branch of government. As I mentioned
earlier, the Constitutional Convention in 1846 and 1847 relied heavily on
the fact that if the judiciary were to be truly independent, it must have
the same roots in the people as the executive and legislative branches of
government. While this leads to the problems which have been
discussed-accountability versus independence and representativeness
versus individual judgment-it strengthens the hand of the judiciary
when dealing with the other branches.
When discussing budget problems with the legislature and the
governor, I was not shy in asserting that I, like the governor, had been
elected by all the people of the state. I believe the electoral process
materially strengthens the political power of the judiciary as a co-equal
branch. No one can ever criticize Wisconsin judges, as they do federal
judges, by saying they are "unelected." I do not, by that statement,
intimate that judges should create policy; that is not their function. I do
mean, however, that the power of the judiciary, through the constitution,
is a power emanating from the people and not by the largess of the
executive and the legislature.
A legitimate criticism of our system is not only that some politicians
become judges, but that it forces all judges to become politicians. I see
nothing wrong with this if politician is defined as the honorable
profession of ensuring that government performs for the benefit of the
people. Also, from my long experience, I believe that the tripartite
division of government requires judges to make political decisions, such
as what is good and what is necessary for the judiciary, and to have the
skill to secure the necessary resources for the judiciary from the other
branches for a just society. To be a good judge on either a local or state
level requires skill, adroitness, and understanding in dealing with all
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levels of government. In addition, the premise implicit in the common
law is that judges must confront problems, as they have developed in
cases and controversies, that have not been previously addressed. Can
anyone say that "with all deliberate speed" is not a political test? To be
effective, judges must have the political skills and insight to forecast what
will work-at least until the legislature can act.
Some argue that the independence that is required to assure the
protection of civil rights for all, and the rights of minorities in particular,
can only come from an appointed, tenured judiciary. However, this
argument can be countered by noting that the appointed justices of the
United States Supreme Court enforced the Fugitive Slave Law, while the
elected justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court were refused to do so.
I have no doubt that the anti-slavery political environment of Wisconsin
impelled the Wisconsin judges' decision, but I emphasize that appointment, as opposed to election, is not the touchstone of whether civil rights
will be protected. Examining more recent history, when the United
States Supreme Court appeared to lag in protecting the minorities' civil
liberties and rights, who rode "once more into the breach?" It was by
and large elected state judges relying on the "new federalism."
I do not wish to overstate my conclusion, but it seems clear that as
in the days of the Fugitive Slave Law, the judicial "guts" which protect
the oppressed are not necessarily the product of the merit system or of
assured tenure. Such an assertion would denigrate the numerous
courageous judges who daily make decisions that they know may affect
their futures. It is outrageous to predicate a system based on the sub
silentio proposition that only those who are shielded from the personal
consequences of their decisions can make honest and just decisions.
I have pointed out that the elective system in Wisconsin does supply
meritorious and distinguished judges. Would reversion to a so-called
merit system necessarily assure that judges are selected on merit alone?
I think not. Not too long ago I contacted the counsel for a "merit"
appointing panel regarding of one of the panel's three choices for a
leading judicial post. I was greeted with the remark, "What kind of a
Democrat are you to support that guy who ruled against us!" I recall the
incident just to note that merit has different meanings to different
persons. Just this week we have the question of Judge Baer, a touted
merit selection judge appointed by President Clinton, who suppressed
evidence in a situation where it appears the judge erred. The President
considered asking for Judge Baer's resignation. Fortunately, on
reflection, the Executive Office commented that it was only asking for
reconsideration and a possible appeal. It is alarming, however, when
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merit selection tenured judges are threatened with a resignation request
from the executive.
Notwithstanding the crucial financing question, the elective system
allows anyone to be a judicial candidate. On the other hand, the
commission selection system may winnow out applicants on a basis
unrelated to merit and on criteria that are unstated and unknown to
anyone, perhaps on bases that depend only on the momentary caprice of
a committee.
In Wisconsin, the judicial selection committee is the governor's
creature, created by executive order. The governor chooses persons who
are likely to select judges on the basis of the political and personal
preferences of his selectees. While in Wisconsin all may apply who meet
stated minimum standards, I doubt that all applicants are examined for
merit alone. In one merit system when the appointing authority decided
to appoint a friend, the appointing authority modified the merit
commission to better assure that the appointee could not be challenged.
The selection was a good one, but factors in addition to merit were
considered.
Also, the Commission members may be heavily lobbied to make the
"right" selection. Once names have been submitted to him, the governor
will expectedly feel the impact of political pressures.
I particularly object to the usual voluntary merit commission plan
which limits the governor's power to choose an appointee exclusively
from selectees of a commission. Governors in Wisconsin have the
constitutional duty to select judges to fill vacancies and should not allow
that duty to be diffused. A plan that voluntarily or involuntarily limits
a governor's choice is, in my opinion, an unconstitutional surrender of
responsibility in derogation of the people's directives as set out in the
constitution. A governor should make the judicial selection unfettered
by others who would limit his executive prerogative. If the people are
dissatisfied with a selection, it is the governor who should be held
accountable, not a faceless and irresponsible commission. Changing the
constitution so that nominating power resides in a "commission" is not
acceptable either.
The plan proposed by Chief Justice Hallows for the 1973 court
reorganization would avoid this constitutional pitfall. Under Chief
Justice Hallows' plan, the governor would make the nomination of one
person to the commission, and the commission would have the option of
voting qualified or unqualified. There would be no yielding of the power
to nominate.
In short, I strongly believe that our system is not defective to the
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point that it should be discarded. Although it is not "broken," I do
think it needs fixing. The true evil of our elective system is not that it
has affected the quality of our judiciary, or that the quality or integrity
of opinions has been affected. Rather, my problem with our present
system stems from the huge and ever increasing cost of campaigning and
the public's perceptions that arise from that process. I criticize this
process not so much for its effect upon the candidates who eventually
must run for office but for its effect in screening out persons who do not
have access, personal or contributed, to great amounts of money, or
persons who feel uncomfortable raising large amounts of money.
First, I have few qualms with the freedom of speech that allows
persons to contribute unlimited sums of their own money to their own
partisan campaigns. I also believe that legislators' and executives'
responsiveness to their supporters' financial and policy interests rests on
a different basis than the decisions that are made between the parties
who appear before a court.
It would be entirely appropriate, indeed it is necessary, for the state
to finance 100 percent of judicial campaigns with a reasonable statutory
limit on state funding. Assuring the continuation of an honorable,
independent, and qualified judiciary is a public purpose for which tax
money may properly be used. I would eliminate the use of all private
funds for the primary and general elections. Because I believe money
spent for the support of an independent branch of government could rest
on a basis different from that used to support the legislative and
executive policy makers, it would be possible to constitutionally limit the
expenditure of a judicial candidate's personal funds.
An in-depth analysis of all the unsolved ramifications regarding
election law and First Amendment rights that have arisen out of Buckley
v. Valeo,2 and Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,2' and the
effects of the Federal Voting Rights statutes is beyond the scope of this
article. The personal expenditure issue however, deserves a brief
discussion. While the First Amendment right to spend unlimited
amounts of one's own funds for election appears to be undisputed in
partisan elections, that right is less clear where non-partisan judicial
elections are concerned. Moreover, the incentive to spend huge amounts
of personal capital to obtain a semi-monastic judicial position is not
apparent. It would probably never be a problem. The constitutional

20. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
21. 997 F. 2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
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question regarding judicial elections should, however, be explored
further.
Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has pointed out
that all judicial selection processes are tainted with politics, except
perhaps the genetic selection of the hereditary members of the House of
Lords, whose ancestral origins were clearly political.
Presently, the state funds provided by tax return check-offs are
minuscule in light of the total costs. A partial, although not a complete
answer, is full state funding of serious candidates. Obviously, it would
not be in the public interest to fund frivolous contenders or those who
run hoping the opposition skids off the road. Currently, to be placed on
the ballot, only 2000 signatures are needed on nomination papers for the
Supreme Court. These signatures can be obtained by spending an
afternoon in a strategic location. I propose that we revert to the system
in existence in the early 1960s, when nomination papers were to be
obtained in each county in a considerable quantity.
We do have some qualification tests now, for example, the requirement of bar admission for at least five years. Perhaps there should be
additional qualifications in relating to scholarship and experience. We
also have "secret" tests that are applied sub silentio by nominating
commissions. I propose placing the cost of obtaining nomination papers,
and it would not be inconsiderable, on the candidate. Perhaps there can
be other qualifying hurdles that would be constitutional as well. Only
after passing this threshold of qualifications could a judicial candidate
access public funds.
I urge us to maintain an elective system that has served us so well for
so long. I am disheartened that the present campaign costs loom as
impediments to a democratic assurance of an independent, qualified,
competent, and honorable judiciary.
I believe it is worth tinkering with our system to preserve its
essentials. I urge that a commission be established to study the public
financing of judicial campaigns in order to keep the meritorious parts of
elections and to eliminate deleterious ones. President-elect David
Saichek of the State Bar has appointed a commission, of which Justice
Wilcox is a co-chair, to study the "independence of the judiciary."
Because I believe the elective process does implicate and affect the
independence of the judicial branch, perhaps this commission would find
it appropriate to study the process by which judges are elected.
I believe it is the special political and cultural ambience of Wisconsin
that makes our judicial system, indeed our entire political system, work.
As Justice Winslow stated in 1912, "[n]o state ... has been [as]
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successful in eliminating political considerations from judicial contests as
Wisconsin. '
Although I have some misgivings about our elective system as
concerns it the judiciary, I would have grave misgivings were we to adopt
a "merit" commission system. Furthermore, my present misgivings are
not with the product of our current system. We, in Wisconsin, have a
unique political and judicial culture, a heritage of independence,
integrity, honesty, fairness, and openness. And our present system
works! Although flawed, as any other human institution, a system that
can and has produced judges of the quality and character of E. Harold
Hallows should not easily be supplanted. It must be made to work
better.

22. WINSLOW, supra note 6, at 385.

